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Introduction 
 
While international law relating to the management of international watercourses, and 
to the environmental protection of shared freshwater resources in particular, has undergone 
significant development and clarification in recent years, the institutional machinery that 
basin states need to achieve the needed level of cooperation has been developing apace. It is 
now clear that the principle of ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ enjoys pre-eminence as 
the cardinal rule of international law relating to the utilization of international watercourses, 
and considerations of environmental protection are of steadily growing significance for the 
application of this principle.  Indeed, it is arguable that the very normative sophistication and 
comprehensive scope of general environmental rules give added ‘voice’ to environmental 
concerns when determining a reasonable and equitable regime for the utilization of an 
international watercourse (McIntyre, 2007).  With the ongoing elaboration and adoption of 
increasingly sophisticated regional and global conventional arrangements, as well as myriad 
declaratory and codification instruments, there exists greater clarity as to the normative 
requirements inherent in established and emerging legal obligations and principles relating to 
the utilization and environmental protection of international freshwater resources.  Such 
obligations and principles include, inter alia, the due diligence obligation to prevent 
transboundary harm, the general duty to cooperate, the obligation to conduct transboundary 
environmental impact assessment, the precautionary principle, and the so-called ‘ecosystems 
approach’.        
 The most significant development in relation to institutional machinery has been the 
widespread adoption of some form of the ‘common management’ approach, whereby the 
drainage basin is regarded as an integrated whole and is managed, to a greater or lesser extent, 
as an economic unit, with the waters either vested in the community of co-basin states or 
divided among them by agreement.  This approach is accompanied by the establishment of 
international machinery to formulate and implement common policies for the management 
and development of the basin.  Such an orientation has long been advocated by learned 
associations and diplomatic conferences, but has become all the more necessary due to the 
complexity of modern water resources utilization and environmental protection obligations.  
Interestingly, developing states have demonstrated particular interest in the adoption of 
common management institutions for water resources, and this trend may reflect their more 
ready acceptance of such avant-garde legal arrangements than of the so-called ‘ecosystems 
approach’. 
This chapter aims to trace the history of state practice in establishing common 
management institutions, to examine the normative character of a requirement to do so, and to 
outline the implications of this trend towards ‘denationalising’ international watercourses in 
respect of environmental governance in particular.  Specifically, such common management 
institutions tend to be charged with a variety of functions, ranging from information-sharing 
and fact-finding roles to the settlement of inter-state disputes or, crucially, the conduct or 
oversight of transboundary environmental impact assessment procedures.  As their 
environmental responsibilities are normally expressly included in their founding instruments, 
they usually enjoy a clear mandate to act in the interests of environmental protection, as well 
as the technical, legal, political and administrative expertise to do so effectively. 
    
Community of interests approach to international watercourses and 
common management institutions 
 
The institutional structure and purposes of common management regimes vary from 
basin to basin, with different economic problem structures likely to have implications for 
institutional design, (Dombrowsky, 2007: 37) and not all having as yet a role in 
environmental regulation.1  Common management is an approach to managing water 
problems rather than a normative principle of international law, and as such it has been 
endorsed by the international community,2 and adopted by international codification bodies, 
including the Institute of International Law (IIL/IDI),3 the International Law Association 
(ILA),4 and the International Law Commission (ILC)5 (Birnie and Boyle, 1992: 223-224).  
Recommendation 51 of the Action Plan for the Human Environment adopted at the 1972 
Stockholm Conference called for the ‘creation of river basin commissions or other appropriate 
machinery for co-operation between interested States for water resources common to more 
than one jurisdiction’ and set down a number of basic principles by which such commissions 
should be guided.6 Significantly, the introduction to Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 –an agenda for 
environmental action adopted as part of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development held in Rio – provides that 
The widespread scarcity, gradual destruction and aggravated pollution of freshwater 
resources in many world regions, along with the progressive encroachment of 
incompatible activities, demand integrated water resources planning and 
development.7 
 
Indeed, Chapter 18 goes on to suggest what role any institutional machinery established to 
affect such integrated water resources planning and development might play, by stating that  
                                                 
1 Early examples include the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (1963 Agreement 
concerning the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, reprinted in (1963) Tractatenblad Van 
Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden, No. 104), and the Moselle Commission (1961 Protocol concerning the 
Constitution of an International Commission for the Protection of the Moselle Against Pollution). 
2 UN Committee on Natural Resources, UN Doc. W/C.7/2 Add. 6, 1-7; Economic Commission for Europe, 
Committee on Water Problems 1971, UN Doc. E/ECE/Water/9 Annex II; Council of Europe Rec. 436 (1965); 
1972 Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1, Rec. 51; Report of the 
UN Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977.   
3 See, for example, the 1961 Resolution on Non-Maritime International Waters, Article 9; the 1979 Resolution 
on the Pollution of Rivers and Lakes, Article 7(G).  
4 See the International Law Association’s 2004 Berlin Rules on Water resources, Articles 64 and 65.  Indeed, the 
ILA’s 1999 Campione Consolidation provides, in Article 45, a definition of an ‘international watercourse 
administration’ and even provides guidelines on the establishment of such a body (Bogdanović 2001: 72-73, 78-
81).  
5 See, for example, the 1984 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2 (1): 112-116.  
6 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment , Stockholm 5-16 June 1972 (UN 
Publication Sales No. E.73.II.A.14), Chapter II, Section B. 
7 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), 2: 167, para. 18.3. 
In the case of transboundary water resources, there is a need for riparian States to 
formulate water resources strategies, prepare water resources action programmes and 
consider, where appropriate, the harmonisation of those strategies and action 
programmes.8 
 
Prominent examples of common management institutions for water resources include the 
Danube Commission,9 the US-Canadian International Joint Commission,10 the Lake Chad 
Basin Commission,11 the River Niger Commission,12 the Permanent Joint Technical 
Commission for Nile Waters,13 the Zambezi Intergovernmental Monitoring and Co-ordinating 
Committee,14 the Intergovernmental Co-ordinating Committee of the River Plate Basin,15 and 
the Amazonian Cooperation Council.16  Indeed, a 1979 survey conducted by the United 
Nations identified 90 common management institutions concerned with non-navigational uses 
of shared freshwater resources, distributed throughout every region of the world.17 Recent 
estimates suggest that ‘well over one hundred international river commissions have been 
established by states’ (McCaffrey, 2001: 159).    
 
Community of interests 
 
The idea that a community of interests exists in international watercourses, and the 
related idea that those interests can be identified and safeguarded on the basis of equity, have 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 169, para. 18.10. 
9 1948 Convention regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, 33 UNTS 196; 1990 Agreement 
Concerning Co-operation on Management of Water Resources of the Danube Basin. UNTS: United Nations 
Treaty Series. 
10 1909 Treaty relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising Along the Boundary between the US and 
Canada, UN Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions, ST/LEG/SerB/12, 260; 36 Stat. 2448; Legislative Texts,79: 
260; 102 British and Foreign State Papers 137; 4 American Journal of International Law (Suppl.) 239.   
11 1964 Convention and Statute Relating to the Development of the Chad Basin. 
12 1963 Act regarding Navigation and Economic Co-operation between the States of the Niger Basin, 587 UNTS 
9. 
13 1959 Agreement between the UAR and the Republic of Sudan for the Full Utilization of Nile Waters, 453 
UNTS 51, and 1960 Protocol Establishing Permanent Joint Technical Committee. 
14 1987 Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Common Zambezi 
River System (1987) 27 International Legal MaterialsILM 1109. ILM: International Legal Materials] 
15 1969 Treaty on the River Plate Basin, (1969) 8 ILM 905; 1973 Treaty on the River Plate and its Maritime 
Limits, (1974) 13 ILM 251. 
16 1978 Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation (1978) 17 ILM 1045. 
17 See United Nations, Annotated list of multipartite and bipartite commissions concerned with non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses (April, 1979), which lists 48 entries for Europe, 23 for the Americas, 10 for 
Africa, and 9 for Asia.       
received some support in the deliberations of international judicial tribunals.  In the 
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder case, though 
concerned with rights of navigation, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
referred to ‘principles governing international fluvial law in general’ and concluded that  
[T]his community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal 
right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the 
use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of 
any one riparian State in relation to the others.18     
 
Indeed, in the same passage, the PCIJ refers to ‘the possibility of fulfilling the requirements of 
justice and the considerations of utility’, suggesting that the Court anticipated a role for 
considerations of equity in giving effective protection to the rights of states (McCaffrey, 
2001: 152).  This is an example of how the doctrine of equitable utilization functions to 
require the equitable balancing of factors and interests when determining a regime for the 
utilization of a watercourse.  In the recent Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the International Court 
of Justice quoted from the above passage from the River Oder case and stated that 
[M]odern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-
navigational uses of international watercourses as well, as evidenced by the adoption 
of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses by the United Nations General Assembly. 19   
 
On the basis of this principle, the Court concluded that  
 
Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource, and thereby 
depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural 
resources of the Danube … failed to respect the proportionality which is required by 
international law.  
 
This statement of the Court illustrates that ‘the concept of community of interest can function 
not only as a theoretical basis of the law of international watercourses, but also as a principle 
that informs concrete obligations of riparian states, such as that of equitable utilization’ 
(McCaffrey, 2001: 152).  Where a community of interests approach is adopted and 
                                                 
18 Judgment no. 16 (10 Sept. 1929), PCIJ Series A, No. 23, 5-46: 27-28.   
19 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), (1997) ICJ Reports 7, para. 85. 
implemented by means of common management institutions, ‘[A] state’s “interests” in an 
international watercourse system would generally be defined by its present and prospective 
uses of the watercourse as well as its concern for the health of the watercourse ecosystem’ 
(McCaffrey, 2001: 165).     
In terms of state practice, the concept of community of interests is usually traced back 
to a French decree of 1792 dealing with the opening of the Scheldt River to navigation.20  The 
position expressed in this decree was quickly adopted in a number of instruments concerned 
primarily with rights of navigation in international rivers21 (Vitányi, 1979: 34-37).  The 
Vienna Congress of 1815 ‘led to the foundation of the Central Commission for Navigation on 
the Rhine, which was not only the first international river basin organization, but also the first 
international organization in general’ (McCaffrey, 1998: 733; Dombrowsky, 2007, p. 94).  
Indeed, Dombrowsky finds it ‘interesting to note that it was the interdependence created by 
the use of water that gave rise to the foundation of the first modern international 
organization’.  However, some early agreements giving expression to the concept of 
community of interests were not restricted to navigational uses of water.  For example, Article 
4 of the 1905 Treaty of Karlstad between Sweden and Norway provides that ‘[T]he lakes and 
watercourses which form the frontier between the two States or which are situated in the 
territory of both or which flow into the said lakes and watercourses shall be considered as 
common’ (Berber, 1959: 24).  In terms of modern treaty practice, the 1995 Protocol on Shared 
Watercourse Systems, adopted by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
provided in Article 2 that the Member States are to ‘respect and abide by the principle of 
community of interests in the equitable utilization of [shared watercourse] systems and related 
                                                 
20 Décret du 16 Nov. 1792, L. le Fur and G. Chklaver, Recueil des Textes de Droit International (2nd edn, Paris, 
Dalloz, 1934),  p. 67. 
21 These include the Treaty of Peace and Alliance between the French and the Batavian Republic of 16 May 
1795, Article 18, 6 Martens, p. 532, which concerned the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt and the Hondt; the 
Principal Resolution of the Imperial Deputation (Reichsdeputationshauptschluss) of 25 February 1803, 3 
Martens, Supp., p. 239, which concerned the portion of the Rhine shared between Bavaria and Switzerland; the 
Treaty of 14 May 1811 demarcating the frontiers between Prussia and Westphalia, Articles 7 and 9.    
resources.’22  The 2000 Revised SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses,23 however, which 
supersedes the 1995 Protocol, does not contain any corresponding provision but rather follows 
the approach taken under the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention.24  Nevertheless, renewed 
efforts to establish basin-wide cooperative institutions in Southern Africa, in accordance with 
the Revised SADC Protocol, can be observed in the establishment of the Orange-Senqu River 
Commission in 2000, the Limpopo Watercourse Commission in 2003 and the Zambezi 
Watercourse Commission in 2004 (Dombrowsky, 2007: 99).  
Article 1(2) of the 1992 Agreement between Namibia and South Africa on the 
Establishment of a Permanent Water Commission provides that the Commission’s objective 
is, inter alia, ‘to act as technical adviser to the Parties on matters relating to the development 
and utilization of water resources of common interest to the Parties’.25  Also, in 1990, Nigeria 
and Niger concluded an agreement concerning the equitable sharing in the development, 
conservation and use of their common water resources, though the text of the agreement uses 
the term ‘shared river basins’ (McCaffrey, 2001: 157).  The more striking examples of treaties 
expressly employing a ‘community of interests’ approach often concern a single shared 
watercourse system or water resource.  For example, Article 1 of the 1957 Agreement 
between Bolivia and Peru - a Preliminary Economic Study of the Joint Utilization of the 
Waters of Lake Titicaca - expressly refers to ‘the fact that the two countries have joint, 
indivisible and exclusive ownership over the waters of Lake Titicaca’.26  Indeed, these states 
went on to establish in the early 1990s a Binational Authority for the implementation of the 
Binational Master Plan of the Titicaca-Desaguadero-Poopo-Salar de Copaisa System.  It is 
more usual for modern treaties ‘to treat international watercourses as being of common 
                                                 
22 FAO, Treaties Concerning the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Africa (FAO 
Legislative Study 61, 1997), p. 146.  
23 (2001) 40 ILM 321. 
24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (New 
York, 21 May 1997), (1997) 36 ILM 700. 
25 (1993) 32 ILM 1147 (emphasis added). 
26 Legislative Texts, 45: 168. 
interest than to refer to them expressly as common rivers or property,’ (McCaffrey, 2001: 
158).  Examples include agreements which entail the use of the territory of one riparian state 
by another for purposes such as storage27 and agreements which relate to the production and 
division of hydro-electric power in a manner which entails an equitable division of the 
benefits of the shared waters.28        
Numerous commentators have advocated the principle of a community of interests in 
international watercourses and use of the associated common management approach, though 
few would contend that such an approach has evolved, or is likely soon to evolve, into a 
requirement of general or customary international law.  For example, Godana (1985: 49), 
while observing that the notion of a community of interests in international watercourses ‘is 
the legal principle most appropriate for a fully developed legal community’, concedes that 
‘the international community is far from being fully developed’ and that ‘the idea has yet to 
develop into a principle of international law governing international water relations in the 
absence of treaties’.  Similarly, Kaya (2003: 205) concludes that ‘[T]here is not enough 
support for the theory of common management from customary international law’ and, 
further, that  
Despite the dramatic increase in the scale of international cooperation regarding 
international watercourses, it does not suffice [sic] the argument for a common 
management of international watercourses.  In practice, states are seldom willing to 
relinquish their power over a vital resource to international institutions authorized to 
manage an international watercourse independently, or even autonomously. 
 
Caflisch (1992: 59-61; McCaffrey, 2001: 163-164) notes the emergence of the idea in 
international law that certain shared natural resources, such as the deep seabed and celestial 
bodies, are the ‘common heritage of humanity’ and asks whether and to what extent this idea 
                                                 
27 Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, Article 6 
(17 January 1961), 15 UST 1555, 542 UNTS 244; Agreement for the Utilization of the Waters of the Yarmuk 
River between Jordan and Syria (4 June 1953), 184 UNTS 15.  
28 Convention between France and Switzerland for the Development of the Water Power of the Rhone, Article 5 
(Berne, 4 October 1913), Legislative Texts, 197: 708; Treaty between the United States and Canada Relating to 
the Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Article 6 (Washington, DC, 27 February 1950), 132 UNTS 228. 
could be transposed to international watercourses.  He proceeds to consider the merits of 
‘denationalizing’ international watercourses and transferring their management from 
individual states to a joint organization, and concludes that ‘while it is clear that a 
condominium could be established by treaty, one cannot maintain that, by virtue of the rules 
of customary law, the whole of an international watercourse, including its resources, forms a 
condominium’.  Similarly, in the course of her study of international agreements creating 
water management institutions, Dombrowsky (2007: 97) notes that 
While some authors have recommended basin-wide agreements, others have argued 
that membership should be kept as small as possible in order to enhance the respective 
agreement’s problem-solving capacity. From a legal perspective, affected parties 
should be able to participate as appropriate, but a basin-approach is no strict 
requirement. 
 
 
Common management institutions 
 
Common management regimes must, therefore, necessarily be voluntary 
arrangements, established by treaty between basin states.  The rules of general international 
law will not impose a positive obligation and compel basin states to create such regimes.  
According to Olmstead (1967: 9), ‘… international law limits only the state’s freedom of 
unilateral action but does not require joint utilization’.  Indeed, the commentary to Article 64 
of the International Law Association’s (ILA) 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources requires, 
‘[W]hen necessary’, the establishment of ‘a basin-wide or joint agency or commission with 
authority to undertake the integrated management of waters of an international drainage 
basin’, and freely concedes that 
While often basin management mechanisms will be the best or even a necessary 
means for achieving equitable and sustainable management of waters, customary 
international law does not specifically require [that] such institutions be established 
nor does it provide specific details for such mechanisms.     
  
Of course, overarching supra-national legal arrangements for regional integration may not 
care about the creation of transnational water management institutions.  In accordance with 
the requirements of the EU Water Framework Directive, basin-wide institutional 
arrangements have recently been set up for most international rivers basins in Europe, 
whether lying within or stretching beyond the boundaries of the EU.29 
A number of studies examine state practice in respect to international basin 
management organizations and their founding agreements in an effort to characterize a 
number of key types of organization and to identify key features of their institutional design 
(Teclaff, 1967; LeMarquand, 1977; Teclaff, 1996; Kliot et al, 1997; Hamner and Wolf, 1998; 
McCaffrey, 1998; Wolf, 1998; Burchi and Spreij, 2003; Mostert, 2003; Dombrowsky, 2007). 
One recent study of 86 river basin organizations, which includes a detailed review and 
comparative analysis of 12 bodies selected ‘in order to reflect a broad spectrum of scope, 
forms, functions and contexts’, identifies a total of 18 different categories of water uses or 
‘issue areas’ with which such organizations might be concerned.  These include: ‘water 
quality; water quantity; hydropower; ecology; flood control; navigation; irrigation; economic 
development; infrastructure; fishing; river regulation; joint management; hydrological 
monitoring; erosion control; hazard prevention; melioration; recreation/tourism; border issues 
and timber floating’ (Dombrowsky, 2007: 91).  Of course, the organizational structure of such 
institutions will vary greatly depending, inter alia, on the range of issue areas covered, the 
powers and mandate of the institution and the degree of integration and cooperation envisaged 
by the riparian states.  Dombrowsky (2007: 108) observes that 
On the one end of the continuum there are organizations with a hierarchy of decision-
making organs and international secretariats in place.  On the other end are 
commissions and committees composed of representatives of each member state that 
serve as negotiation fora without any formal administrative support. 
 
However, though organizational structures may differ, all international water management 
institutions appear, formally or effectively, to employ decision-making mechanisms requiring 
                                                 
29 Directive 2000/60/EC, (2000) OJ L327/1, Articles 3(3)–(5). 
unanimous vote or consensus (Dombrowsky, 2007: 111-112). It is possible to identify broad 
trends indicating which international watercourses are more or less likely to benefit from the 
adoption of common management arrangements.  For example, joint mechanisms are 
particularly likely to be established by states that use international watercourses intensively 
(McCaffrey, 2001: 159), and for contiguous rather than successive watercourses.  Here the 
interests of riparian states/countries are often more obviously and intimately interconnected, 
and where ‘It is obvious that any works involving both banks of a river – such as a dam – 
would have to be the subject of agreement and close co-operation between the co-riparians’ 
(McCaffrey, 2001: 168).  In addition, though empirical evidence ‘seems to indicate the 
likelihood that organizations are set up appears to be higher in multipartite basins than in 
bipartite basins’ … ‘the number of multipartite river basins with strictly basin-wide 
arrangements is small’ (Dombrowsky, 2007: 95, 99).    
Though common management arrangements must be entered into by states 
voluntarily, it is apparent that the accumulated practice of states in participating in such 
arrangements should serve to bolster the normative status, in customary or general 
international law, of the various rules comprising the general duty to cooperate.  This 
arrangement is generally understood as consisting of a number of specific procedural 
obligations, such as the duty to notify, the duty to consult and/or negotiate in good faith, the 
ongoing exchange of information, the duty to warn, and duties in relation to the settlement of 
disputes (Okowa, 1996: 275 et seq.; Sands, 2000: 374; McIntyre, 2007: 317-357).  State 
practice in relation to common management could, in turn, inform the normative content of 
such procedural rules by making it clear that bona fide participation in common management 
institutions would satisfy the obligations inherent therein.  Interestingly, the 1992 United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,30 which, at the end of 2000, had 26 
signatories and 32 parties, requires parties to ‘enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
other arrangements’ which ‘shall provide for the establishment of joint bodies’ having a wide 
range of environmental tasks.31  Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that common 
management would become a more acceptable and attractive approach if recognition of the 
physical unity of the drainage basin were to gain ground in international law.  Indeed, the 
ongoing evolution and development of the so-called ‘ecosystems approach’ to the 
environmental protection of international watercourses is likely to considerably enhance legal 
recognition of the physical unity of drainage basins and so to highlight the need for common 
management institutions (McIntyre, 2004: 1 et seq.).  In the context of a discussion on ‘the 
need for ecomanagement’ of international watercourses, Kaya (2003: 189) concludes that  
Under the light of the findings of the examination of the relevant sources of 
international law in the present study, it seems necessary to establish a treaty regime 
with an active and continuing revisional element which can only be achieved by 
setting up a joint water institution with adequate powers and means in each basin.  
 
Similarly, the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses would appear expressly to encourage watercourse states to enter into common 
management arrangements.  Most significantly, the principle of ‘equitable participation’, 
which is set out under Article 5(2) and is closely linked to practical implementation of the 
cardinal principle of equitable utilization,32 suggests the nature and scope of the role 
potentially to be played by joint mechanisms.  The ILC commentary to its 1994 Draft 
Articles, which preceded the Convention, explains that Article 5(2) involves ‘not only the 
right to utilize an international watercourse, but also the duty to cooperate actively with other 
                                                 
30 (1992) 31 ILM 1312. 
31 Article 9(1) and (2). 
32 Article 5(2) provides that ‘Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.  Such participation includes both the right to 
utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the 
present Convention’. 
watercourse States in the protection and development of the watercourse’33 and it is 
persuasively argued that the provision ‘not only requires co-ordination but also more 
significant forms of co-operation’ (Tanzi and Arcari, 2001: 109).  Indeed, the same authors 
contend that a state’s failure to participate actively in the procedural requirements inherent in 
equitable participation ‘will make it difficult for that State to claim that its planned or actual 
use is … equitable under Article 5 of the Convention.’  Therefore, any invitation to join or 
participate in a regional water body or river basin commission is likely to be considered 
carefully by riparian states.  Also, in the context of the general obligation imposed upon 
watercourse states by Article 8 of the UN Convention to cooperate ‘in order to attain optimal 
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse’, Article 8(2) expressly 
proposes the use of joint mechanisms and commissions, providing that 
In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may consider the 
establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them, to 
facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of experience 
gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various 
regions.  
 
It is interesting to note that the explicit reference to ‘the establishment of joint mechanisms or 
commissions’ under Article 8(2) was not included in the 1994 ILC Draft Articles, but inserted 
later, perhaps signalling growing acceptance of the common management approach and 
growing awareness of its merits.   
It is to be assumed that such arrangements would also generally be regarded as 
effective in facilitating the regular exchange of data and information required under Article 9.  
Article 9(1) provides that  
Pursuant to Article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis exchange readily 
available data and information on the condition of the watercourse, in particular that of 
a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological nature and related to 
the water quality as well as related forecasts.   
 
                                                 
33 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session (1994), A/49/10/1994, p. 
220.  See also, (1994) 24/6 Environmental Policy and Law, pp. 335-368. 
From the kinds of information listed under Article 9(1), it is apparent that regular and 
effective exchange of such information, facilitated by common management institutions, 
could have a significant role to play in determining an equitable regime for the use or 
development of an international watercourse.  This follows the principle of equitable 
utilization as elaborated under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, and in ensuring that 
environmental issues are anticipated, detected and understood.   
In addition, Article 21 provides, in relation to the ‘prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution’ that ‘[W]atercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, 
prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may cause 
significant harm …’ and that ‘[W]atercourse States shall take steps to harmonize their policies 
in this connection.’34 As the ‘mutually agreeable measures and methods’ envisaged under 
Article 21 for this purpose include, inter alia, ‘[S]etting joint water quality objectives and 
criteria’,35 the potential role for common management machinery is obvious.  Furthermore, 
Article 24, which deals with the ‘management’ of international watercourses, provides that 
‘[W]atercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into consultations concerning 
the management of an international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a 
joint management mechanism.’36  This provision would appear to suggest the efficacy of 
using permanent common management institutions for the purpose of planning the 
environmental protection of the watercourse, as it further provides that ‘management’ refers, 
in particular, to: 
(a) Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and 
providing for the implementation of any plans adopted; and 
 
(b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection and control of 
the watercourse.’37 
 
                                                 
34 Article 21(2), (emphasis added). 
35 Article 21(3) (a). 
36 Article 24(1) (emphasis added). 
37 Article 24(2). 
While the 1994 commentary to ILC Draft Article 24 notes that ‘States have, in practice, 
established numerous joint river, lake and similar commissions, many of which are charged 
with management of the international watercourses’, it emphasises that it ‘does not require … 
that they establish a joint organization, such as a commission, or other management 
mechanism’, and points out that ‘[M]anagement of international watercourses may also be 
effected through less formal means, however, such as by the holding of regular meetings 
between the appropriate agencies or other representatives of the States concerned.’38  Finally, 
the Convention envisages a role for common management mechanisms in relation to the 
settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, 
providing that 
If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation … they may jointly 
seek the good offices of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make 
use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse institution that may have been 
established by them ….39 
 
 
In relation to its merits, most commentators would agree that ‘the notion that all riparian 
states have a community of interests in an international watercourse reinforces the doctrine of 
limited territorial sovereignty [and thus, equitable utilization], rather than in any way 
contradicting that doctrine’ and put forward several advantages of such an approach where it 
is adopted (McCaffrey, 2001: 168).  For example, it ‘expresses more accurately the normative 
consequences of the physical fact that a watercourse is, after all, a unity’ and that ‘it implies 
collective, or joint action’ and ‘evokes shared governance’.  Commentators have for some 
time expressed concern that, in the absence of common management arrangements, the 
traditional substantive rules of international watercourses law, including the no-harm rule and 
the principle of equitable utilization, may be of limited avail in handling problems of water 
                                                 
38 Supra, n. 33, p. 301.   
39 Article 33(1), (emphasis added). 
scarcity and quality (Caflisch, 1992: 139; Tanzi and Arcari, 2001: 18).  For example, one 
leading commentator noted in 1974 in relation to equitable utilization that 
Yet there is a narrowness in the doctrine that contains the seeds of nationalistic 
inefficiency.  The doctrine of equitable utilization contemplates cutting the resources 
of the river basin up into equitable shares, each share to be independently developed 
by each riparian …  However, as admirable as equitable independent development 
may be, independent development is not likely to make the most productive use of the 
resource (Utton, 1974: 182).       
 
Similarly, according to Tanzi and Arcari (2001: 18 – 21), 
 
[I]t is against the background of such considerations that the concept of optimal 
utilization of international watercourses to be pursued by riparian States through the 
integrated management and development thereof has gained widespread acceptance in 
legal literature and in the international governmental fora. 
 
The same authors also note that ‘in the modern formulation of the equitable utilization 
principle, the goal of sustainable use should be coordinated with the more utilitarian paradigm 
of optimal utilization’, and that 
…it is apparent that the sound realisation of sustainable use depends on the same co-
operation and participation among riparian States in the joint and integrated 
management of the shared watercourse that we have previously indicated as 
prerequisites for optimal utilization. 
 
They go on to conclude that the procedural requirements inherent in the clearly established 
legal obligation of states to cooperate can only be facilitated by means of permanent technical 
institutional machinery: 
[I]f … exchange of information, consultation and notification are critical for the 
concrete determination of the substantive entitlement of States in the use of 
international watercourses, it is patent that the long-term goals of optimal and 
sustainable use of river waters can be adequately served only when procedural co-
operation among riparians is carried out on a permanent, rather than on an occasional, 
basis.  
 
It would appear, however, that the effectiveness of establishing common management 
machinery for the specific purpose of environmental management of international 
watercourses in particular has been obvious for some time and is becoming ever more so.  
One commentator noted in 1988 that: 
The tendency to create new institutions for environmental management is not a new 
one; it is inherent in the nature of the issues.  Among the oldest institutions for the 
management of an environmental resource are those dealing with the allocation and 
use of water … (Von Moltke, 1988: 89-91).   
 
He goes on to cite early examples, including the Commission of the River Rhine established 
at the Congress of Vienna,40 but made operational by the 1868 Treaty of Mannheim, the 
Danube Commission established in 1878, and the International Boundary and Water 
Commission of the US and Mexico established in 1889.  Von Moltke quotes at length from 
the concluding remarks of a report compiled during a seminar on the work of international 
river basin commissions organized by the OECD in 1977, which could then observe that 
During the last ten years, a marked strengthening of international cooperation has been 
noted for solving problems of transfrontier pollution in international water basins.  
More Commissions had been established and yet more were now the subject of 
negotiations, with the result that there would soon be a Commission responsible for 
each frontier in OECD countries where bodies of fresh water were exposed to 
transfrontier pollution. 
 
The report commented on the significance of one common feature of such commissions, i.e. 
that they tended to possess scientific and technical expertise and were usually in a position to 
provide impartial advice based on such expertise.     
 
Therefore, although the more radical concept of ‘shared natural resources’, which was based 
on notions of common property and mooted by several international fora as a means of 
describing the legal status of some transboundary natural resources,41 including freshwaters,42 
                                                 
40 For the text of the 1815 Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, see Droit International et Histoire Diplomatique, 
(Paris 1970), 2: 6. . 
41 See, in particular, the 1978 UNEP Governing Council’s Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the 
Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources 
Shared by Two or More States, 17 ILM 1097 (1978); Article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, UNGA Res. 3281(XXIX).   
42 See, in particular, Sections G and H of the Mar del Plata Action Plan, Report of the United Nations Water 
Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977, UN Doc. E/CONF.70/29 (1977), pp. 49-55. 
has been comprehensively rejected by states (Schwebel, 1980: 180-197), some of the ‘basic 
ideas underlying the concept of shared resources and the theory of community of interests are, 
nonetheless, taking root in the field of the law of international watercourses’ (Tanzi and 
Arcari, 2001: 22-23).  In the absence of legal compulsion, states are simply entering into 
practical and effective arrangements which recognise the unitary nature of international 
watercourses or drainage basins, and the resulting interdependence of riparian states, and the 
advantages of cooperating to achieve optimal utilization thereof.  Indeed, as Cecil Olmstead 
could observe (1967: 7): 
Since man cannot change the given geographical facts and has difficulty altering 
established political boundaries, he must learn to develop co-operatively these 
international resources for the maximum benefits of all.  Although international law … 
does not require that such co-basin States jointly develop these waters.  However, in 
recognition of their common interest, increasingly such States will voluntarily enter 
into joint planning and development agreements governing international drainage 
basins.          
 
 
International river commissions and environmental protection 
 
It is, of course, very difficult to study empirically the relative significance attached to 
environmental factors in state practice relating to the utilization of international watercourses, 
as such practice will often take place at a confidential and unrecorded diplomatic level.  
Therefore, it is very useful to examine the practice of the many international joint 
commissions established to facilitate inter-governmental agreement in river basin planning 
and utilization.  Such bodies vary greatly in terms of their composition and function, but 
almost all possess considerable technical skills and resources and operate under an express 
mandate to further the environmental protection of the international watercourse and, 
possibly, the wider natural environment.  This trend has become more marked in recent years.  
For example, the 1994 Agreements on the Protection of the Rivers Meuse and Scheldt created 
an international commission to facilitate cooperation between the parties for the purposes of 
the environmental protection of the rivers.43  Similarly, the 1994 Convention on Co-operation 
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River44 established an international 
commission45 to ensure cooperation to ‘at least maintain and improve the current 
environmental and water quality conditions of the Danube River and of the waters in its 
catchment area and to prevent and reduce as far as possible adverse impacts and changes 
occurring or likely to be caused.’46  The Danube Commission has more specific functions 
including, where appropriate, the establishment of emission limits applicable to individual 
industrial sectors, the prevention of the release of hazardous substances and the definition of 
water quality objectives.47      
The practice of the US-Canada International Joint Commission (IJC) is particularly 
instructive as it is one of the longest established such bodies and provides a comprehensive 
record of reported environmental impact considerations in the context of the use of shared 
freshwaters (Fuentes, 1998: 150-155).  The IJC was established by the 1909 Boundary Waters 
Treaty for the purpose of issuing orders of approval in response to applications for the use, 
obstruction, or diversion of the shared boundary waters which may affect the natural water 
levels or flows.48  The IJC may also investigate specific issues if so requested by both states.49  
For example, in 1975 the state parties requested the IJC examine and report on the 
transboundary implications of the proposed completion and operation of the Garrison 
Diversion scheme in the State of North Dakota.  The Commission was asked to make 
recommendations in relation to modifications, alterations or adjustments that might assist in 
meeting the obligations of Article IV of the 1909 Treaty, which provides, inter alia, that ‘the 
waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be 
                                                 
43 (1995) 34 ILM 851 and 859, Article 2(2). 
44 (1994) 5 Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Doc. 16. 
45 Under Article 4. 
46 Article 2(2). 
47 Article 7. 
48 Articles III and IV. 
49 Article IX. 
polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other’.  The governments of 
Canada and Manitoba objected to the project, inter alia, on the grounds that it would 
adversely affect water quality as well as fish and wildlife resources in Manitoba by the 
transfer of foreign biota.  The IJC concluded that the project as originally envisaged by the 
United States would cause injury to health and property in Canada as a result of adverse 
impacts on the water quality and on the biological resources of Manitoba, and that domestic, 
industrial and agricultural uses of boundary waters in the province would be detrimentally 
affected.50  For example, it calculated that the local commercial fishing industry would suffer 
a loss of CAD 6 million and that ‘under such conditions the commercial fishing industry 
could be eliminated with all the attendant consequences’.  Furthermore, the Commission 
anticipated the annual loss of 35,000 ducks in Manitoba.  The IJC concluded generally that, 
although most of the adverse impacts could be mitigated, those from possible biota transfers 
were so serious that the only acceptable solution was to delay the construction of those 
features of the project which could result in such transfers.  Thus the IJC was effectively 
adopting an ‘ecosystems approach’ in its consideration of the potential adverse impacts of the 
project.   
 
Similarly, in 1977, the state parties requested the IJC to examine and report on the water 
quality of the Poplar River, 
including the transboundary water implications of the thermal power station of the 
Saskatchewan Power Corporation and its ancillary facilities, including coal mining, at 
a site near Coronach, Saskatchewan, and to make recommendations which would 
assist Governments in ensuring that the provisions of Article IV of the said [1909] 
Treaty are honoured.51   
 
The Commission found that the resulting reduction in the quantity of water crossing the 
boundary was expected to have an adverse effect on the existing biological community in the 
                                                 
50 International Joint Commission, Transboundary Implications of the Garrison Diversion Unit (1977), pp. 59-
60. 
51 International Joint Commission, Water Quality in the Poplar River Basin (1981), pp. 197-210.  
East Fork of the Poplar River.  Although this did not amount to pollution that would violate 
Article IV of the 1909 Treaty, the Commission suggested that the detrimental effect should 
nevertheless be taken into account by the governments.  Once again, the IJC appears to have 
taken an expansive view of the project’s environmental impacts based on an ‘ecosystems 
approach’.  Also, between December 1984 and February 1985, the IJC was requested  
to examine and report upon the water quality and quantity implications of the 
proposed coal mine development on Cabin Creek in British Columbia near its 
confluence with the Flathead River, and to make recommendations which would assist 
Governments in ensuring that the provisions of Article IV of the said treaty are 
honoured.52   
 
The Commission concluded unequivocally that the development would pollute the waters of 
the Flathead River so as to have a serious impact on its fisheries, and that the effects of the 
proposed coal mine would constitute a breach of Article IV of the 1909 Treaty.  It is 
interesting to note that in its report on this controversy, the IJC appears to have provided a 
very early articulation of the precautionary principle as it might apply to the environmental 
protection of international watercourses.  In respect to transboundary pollution in possible 
contravention of Article IV of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, it observed: 
when any proposed development project has been shown to create an identifiable risk 
… existence of that risk should be sufficient to prevent the development from 
proceeding.  This principle should apply, even though the degree of the risk cannot be 
measured with certainty, unless and until it is agreed that such an impact – or the risk 
of it occurring – is acceptable to both parties (Benidickson, 2007: 509).   
 
However, despite the fact that ‘[O]ver nearly a century the IJC has investigated and advised 
on dozens of controversies and concerns along roughly three thousand miles of shared border’ 
(Benidickson, 2007: 507-510), its remit is limited by the fact that the Boundary Waters Treaty 
does not provide for automatic or mandatory referral to the ICJ, nor for citizen or NGO 
enforcement.  This shortcoming has been clearly illustrated by the recent controversy over the 
construction of an artificial outflow for the removal of excess water from Devil’s Lake in the 
                                                 
52 International Joint Commission, Impacts of a Proposed Coal Mine in the Flathead River Basin (1988), p. 3.   
US state of North Dakota into the Sheyenne River, a tributary of the Red River which flows 
into the Canadian province of Manitoba.  Though concerns have been raised in relation to the 
level of dissolved solids in these waters, and biota transfer and nutrient loadings in Lake 
Winnipeg, the federal governments of both states have declined to refer the matter to the IJC 
and the Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) – the latter established in the 
context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The CEC dismissed a 
submission by Canadian and US environmental NGOs contending that by neglecting to refer 
the cross-border dispute to the ICJ, Canada and the USA have failed in their obligation of 
effective enforcement of environmental laws.  This situation has prompted one commentator 
to note: 
Thus, if the federal governments choose to jointly ignore a transboundary pollution 
problem or resolve it through other means, citizens or other affected parties have no 
recourse under the treaty or through new mechanisms (Hall, 2007: 723). 
 
Indeed, in respect to persistent controversies concerning the Columbia River, commentators 
have recently concluded that the US and Canada ‘have yet to fully demonstrate that they are 
willing to trust international institutions or processes with responsibility for transboundary 
watershed management’ (Saunders and Wenig, 2006: 136).  This aptly illustrates the 
reservations that states may have when it comes to entrusting their vital interests to common 
management institutions, even institutions as long and well established as the IJC, and may 
explain why very few such bodies have as yet a central role in inter-state dispute settlement.   
Nevertheless, the potential role of such joint bodies has been considerably augmented in 
recent years by means of their express mention in a number of important framework and 
regional conventions relating to international watercourses.  This chapter has outlined above 
the express recognition of the valuable role that joint commissions can play under Article 8 of 
the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, which sets out the general duty to cooperate under 
international law. Such joint mechanisms or commissions would be particularly useful in 
giving effect to the specific measures and methods for preventing, reducing, and controlling 
pollution of an international watercourse suggested under Part IV of the UN Convention.53  
For example, the 2000 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Revised Protocol 
on Shared Watercourses, which was adopted largely to give effect to key provisions contained 
in the 1997 UN Convention,54 sets out a very detailed institutional framework for its 
implementation.55  It lists four SADC Water Sector Organizations: 
(i) the Committee of Water Ministers; 
(ii) the Committee of Water Senior Officials; 
(iii) the Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit; and 
(iv) the Water Resources Technical Committee and sub-Committees. 
These organizations are intended to function, at various levels, to assist in the implementation 
of the Protocol and to coordinate the work of shared watercourse institutions.  Article 5(2) (c), 
for example, charges the Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit to, inter alia: 
(ii) Liaise with other SADC organs and shared watercourse institutions on matters 
pertaining to the implementation of this protocol; and 
 
(ix) Keep an inventory of all shared watercourse management institutions and their 
agreements on shared watercourses within the SADC region.  
 
Article 5(3) goes on to deal with such shared watercourse institutions, stating: 
 
(a) Watercourse states undertake to establish appropriate institutions such as 
watercourse commissions, water authorities or boards as may be determined. 
 
(b) The responsibilities of such institutions shall be determined by the nature of their 
objectives which must be in conformity with the principles set out in this Protocol. 
 
                                                 
53 For example, Article 21(3) proposes that watercourse states introduce the following measures and methods: 
 (a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; 
   (b) Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point and non-point sources; 
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the waters of an international 
watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored. 
54 40 ILM (2001) 321.  Not in force.  The Revised Protocol incorporates all the key substantive provisions 
contained in the 1997 Convention, and its Preamble expressly refers to the Convention, stating at para.1: 
‘Bearing in mind the progress with the development and codification of international water law initiated 
by the Helsinki Rules and that the United Nations subsequently adopted the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.’    
55 Article 5. 
(c) Shared watercourse institutions shall provide on a regular basis or as required by 
the Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit, all the information necessary to assess 
progress on the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol, including the 
development of their respective agreements. 
 
This provision strongly suggests that the state parties consider active participation in 
watercourse commissions to be a practical necessity for meeting the requirements and 
objectives of the Revised Protocol.    
In contrast to the 1997 UN Convention, Article 9 of the 1992 ECE Helsinki Convention, 
which concerns bilateral and multilateral cooperation, expressly requires that bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or other arrangements entered into by the parties pursuant to the 
Convention ‘shall provide for the establishment of joint bodies’.56  Article 9(2) goes on to 
elaborate in some detail on the various roles that such bodies shall undertake, stating that  
The tasks of these joint bodies shall be, inter alia, and without prejudice to relevant 
existing agreements or arrangements, the following: 
(a) To collect, compile and evaluate data in order to identify pollution sources likely to 
cause transboundary impact; 
(b) To elaborate joint monitoring programmes concerning water quality and quantity; 
(c) To draw up inventories and exchange information on the pollution sources mentioned 
[above]; 
(d) To elaborate emission limits for waste water and evaluate the effectiveness of control 
programmes; 
(e) To elaborate joint water-quality objectives and criteria … and to propose relevant 
measures for maintaining and, where necessary, improving water quality; 
(f) To develop concerted action programmes for the reduction of pollution loads from 
both point sources (e.g. municipal and industrial sources) and diffuse sources 
(particularly from agriculture); 
(g) To establish warning and alarm procedures; 
(h) To serve as a forum for the exchange of information on existing and planned uses of 
water and related installations that are likely to cause transboundary impact; 
(i) To promote cooperation and exchange of information on the best available technology 
in accordance with the provisions of article 13 of this Convention, as well as to 
encourage cooperation in scientific research programmes; 
(j) To participate in the implementation of environmental impact assessments relating to 
transboundary waters, in accordance with appropriate international regulations.      
                                                 
56 Article 9(2) (emphasis added). 
 Article 9 further provides for non-riparian coastal states, directly and significantly affected by 
transboundary impacts stemming from the use of international watercourses, to participate in 
the activities of multilateral joint bodies established by riparians.57  It also states that 
coordination is necessary where two or more joint bodies exist in the same catchment area.58  
The 1992 Convention even provides a definition of a ‘joint body’ as ‘any bilateral or 
multilateral commission or other appropriate institutional arrangements for cooperation 
between the Riparian Parties’.59    
It is clear that practical application of a normative principle involving ‘multi-layered 
complexity’ which is, almost by definition, somewhat legally indeterminate, can be greatly 
assisted by means of expert institutional machinery.  In a discussion of so-called ‘sophist 
principles’, among which he includes equitable utilization, Franck (1995: 67, 81-82) observes 
that they ‘usually require an effective, credible, institutionalized, and legitimate interpreter of 
the rule’s meaning in various instances’.  Obviously, the increasingly common practice of 
establishing international joint commissions creates technically competent inter-governmental 
bodies with responsibility for identifying, in detail, the adverse environmental effects of any 
ongoing or planned use of an international watercourse, and a formal procedural mechanism 
for presenting its findings and recommendations in this regard.  Therefore, this practice 
almost inevitably serves to bring environmental considerations to the fore.  However, two 
specific elements central to the development of modern international environmental law 
relating to international watercourses tend to further encourage and support the establishment 
of permanent, joint technical commissions: firstly, the advent of the so-called ‘ecosystems’ 
approach, which has potentially very far-reaching implications for international watercourse 
utilization and which requires considerable technical cooperation and competence; and 
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secondly, the widespread use and increasing sophistication of procedures for transboundary 
environmental impact assessments (EIA) provide a clear role for joint technical commissions.  
Such commissions may often be required to oversee or to assist in the implementation of a 
formal transboundary EIA process.    
 
Ecosystems approach 
 
Traditionally, customary and conventional rules relating to environmental protection and 
the utilization of shared natural resources have been based firmly on the notion of state 
sovereignty and have therefore focused on the protection of territorial interests.  Generally, 
environmental considerations have only had legal significance to the extent that they coincide 
with such territorial interests.  In other words, environmental harm would only be legally 
prohibited to the extent that it involved a violation of territorial integrity.  This has been 
particularly true in the case of shared freshwater resources, where ‘the focus of the equitable 
use principle is on the balancing of different use interests in the resource and not on the 
protection of ecological interests’ and where ‘rights and obligations under the equitable use 
rule also remain anchored in the territorial sovereignty of riparian States over the shared 
resource’ (Brunnée and Toope, 1995: 54).  However, in recent years, many international 
instruments creating regimes for the utilization and protection of international watercourses 
appear to have moved beyond the traditional obligations to utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner and to prevent significant transboundary 
harm.  They now increasingly include ‘purely’ environmental obligations, including 
provisions which require the adoption of a more ecosystem-oriented approach to such 
protection (McIntyre, 2004: 1). 
 The trend whereby legal instruments relating to international watercourses now tend to 
require states to take an ecosystem approach to the protection of such watercourses has been 
greatly advanced by the adoption of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention.  It expressly 
requires states party to the Convention to act to protect and preserve international watercourse 
ecosystems.60  In the context of the elaboration of the 1997 Convention, Tanzi and Arcari  
(2001: 8-9; Francis, 1993: 315; Tarlock, 1996: 181) explain that the fact that 
. . . progress made in scientific research further shows that the uses of watercourses 
can affect and be affected by processes related to other natural elements, such as soil 
degradation and desertification, deforestation and climate change … has brought water 
specialists in the last decade to advocate the adoption of less economic-oriented  
criteria for the management of freshwater resources, following an ‘ecosystem 
approach’. 
 
For example, central to the adoption of an ecosystems approach to the protection of an 
international watercourse is the establishment of a regime of ‘environmental flows’, which ‘is 
increasingly accepted as an essential component in achieving integrated water resources 
management (IWRM)61 and for addressing issues of river health, sustainable development, 
and the sharing of benefits between users’ (Scanlon and Iza, 2003: 83). The environmental 
flow concept has been defined by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
as ‘the water regime provided within a river, wetland or coastal zone to maintain ecosystems 
and their benefits where there are competing uses and where flows are regulated’ (Dyson, 
Bergkamp and Scanlon, 2003: 3-5).  The IUCN guide document goes on to explain that ‘[T]he 
goal of environmental flows is to provide a flow regime that is adequate in terms of quantity, 
quality and timing for sustaining the health of the rivers and river systems’, but also stresses 
the significance of social and economic factors. 
It is possible to discern, from the recent practice of states and international 
organizations in relation to shared water resources, a shift in emphasis from a purely territorial 
and resource utilization focus to a more ecosystem-oriented approach.  For example, Article 
                                                 
60 See, in particular, Article 20.  See also Articles 22 and 23. 
61 IWRM has been defined by the Global Water Partnership as  
‘the process which promotes the co-ordinated development and management of water, land and related 
issues in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.’ 
See Global Water Partnership, IWRM, Technical Paper No. 4, available online at 
www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library/TACN04.pdf.   
2(2)(d) of the 1992 UNECE Convention requires parties ‘[T]o ensure conservation and, where 
necessary, restoration of ecosystems’, while Article 3(1)(i) requires them to ensure that 
‘[S]ustainable water-resources management, including the application of the ecosystems 
approach, is promoted’.  Article 2(2)(b) further requires that ‘transboundary waters are used 
with the aim of ecologically sound and rational water management, conservation of water 
resources and environmental protection’.  Significantly for the potential scope of an 
ecosystem approach to environmental protection, the Helsinki Convention alludes to and 
distinguishes between ‘Parties’62 and ‘Riparian Parties’63 and between provisions relating to 
all parties and those relating to riparian parties alone.  The provisions relating to all parties 
mostly contain common environmental protection and ecosystem management obligations,64 
whereas those relating to the riparian parties alone are mostly concerned with cooperation 
among the riparian states and joint management of the water resource.65  Also, a number of 
recent treaties governing the Rhine,66 Danube,67 Meuse, and Scheldt,68 negotiated in 
accordance with the 1992 Helsinki Convention, demonstrate a broad commitment to 
ecosystem protection.  Article 2(3) of the 1998 Rhine Convention, for example, applies to 
‘aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems interacting with the Rhine or whose interaction with the 
Rhine could be re-established’.  The Danube Convention, in turn, aims at the protection of the 
‘riverine environment’ and the ‘aquatic ecosystems’, at ‘sustainable development and 
environmental protection of the Danube River’, and at ‘the conservation and restoration of 
ecosystems.’69  Moreover, the 1990 Elbe Convention,70 which predates the Helsinki 
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67 Convention on Co-operation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River (Sofia, 29 June 
1994), Articles 1(c), 2(3) and (5). 
68 Agreements on the Protection of the Meuse and Scheldt (Charleville Mezieres, 26 April 1994), Article 3. 
69 Articles 1(c) and 2(3). 
70 Convention of the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe (Magdeburg, 8 October 1990). 
Convention, requires parties to cooperate to achieve a healthy diversity of river species and as 
natural an ecosystem as possible. 
 A broad-based ecosystem approach has also received varying degrees of support 
among the declarations and resolutions of international organizations and codifying bodies, 
including various United Nations water and environmental conferences,71 the Experts Group 
on Environmental Law of the WCED72 (Munro and Lammers, 1987: 45-54), the Commission 
on Sustainable Development,73 and the International Law Association.74  In 1982, the United 
Nations Environment Programme noted in the period from 1972 to 1982, the ‘increasing 
recognition of the need for better management of water resources by treating river basins as 
unitary wholes’ (Holdgate, Kassas and White, 1982: 124), and in 1991 the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development noted the increasing number of calls for ecosystem 
management of international watercourses (OECD, 1991: 69).  The UN medium-term plan for 
the period 1992-1997 expressly recognised the threats posed to international watercourse 
ecosystems by socio-economic development and activities, stating: 
Interactions between freshwater ecosystems on the one hand and human activities on 
the other are becoming more complex and incompatible as socio-economic 
development proceeds.  Water basin development activities can have negative impacts 
too, leading to unsustainable development, particularly where these water resources 
are shared by two or more States.75    
 
The approach was expressly endorsed by Chapter 18 of Agenda 21, which stated that the 
general objective is: 
                                                 
71 See, for example, Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977, UN 
Doc. E/CONF.70/29; Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, reprinted in (1992) 22 
Environmental Policy and Law 54. 
72 See, for example, Article 3 and the accompanying commentary, which defines an ecosystem as a system of 
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73 See Commission on Sustainable Development, Review of Sectoral Clusters: Freshwater Resources, Report to 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/CN.17/1994, reported in (1994) 24 Environmental Policy and Law 212. 
74 See the ILA Draft Articles on the Relationship Between Water, Other Natural Resources and the Environment, 
Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference (1980) 374. 
75 Medium-term plan for the period 1992-1997, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 6, UN Doc. A/47/6/Rev.1, 
vol. I, major programme IV, International economic cooperation for development, Programme 16 
(Environment), p. 221, para. 16.25 (McCaffrey, 2001: 388). 
… to make certain that adequate supplies of water of good quality are maintained for 
the entire population of this planet, while preserving the hydrological, biological and 
chemical functions of the ecosystems, adapting human activities within the capacity 
limits of nature ….76   
 
Chapter 18 goes on to explain the significance of the ecosystem approach for integrated water 
resources management and, thus, for the effective protection of the quality and supply of 
freshwater resources: 
Integrated water resources management is based on the perception of water as an 
integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource and a social and economic good, 
whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization.  To this end, water 
resources have to be protected, taking into account the functioning of aquatic 
ecosystems and the perenniality of the resource, in order to satisfy and reconcile needs 
for water in human activities.  In developing and using water resources, priority has to 
be given to the satisfaction of basic needs and the safeguarding of ecosystems.77  
 
Notwithstanding the non-binding character of Agenda 21, more than 180 states participating 
in the UNCED process have subscribed to it.  This subscription is likely to prove influential in 
‘reconceptualising the problems concerning the use and management of watercourses’ in the 
further elaboration of the overarching concept of sustainable development (Tanzi and Arcari, 
2001: 10).  Also, while the 1997 UN Convention, which endorses the ecosystems approach by 
means of Articles 20-23, [is not yet in force, it is contained in a General Assembly Resolution 
that was adopted with a majority of 103 to 3, with 27 abstentions (McCaffrey, 2001: 390). 
It seems reasonable to assume that the obligation to protect watercourse ecosystems, 
as set out under Article 20 of the 1997 UN Convention, is one of due diligence, rather than a 
‘strict’ obligation for which there are only very limited defences (ILC Report, 1994: 291-
292;Tanzi and Arcari, 2001: 246).  Therefore, Article 20 requires all states potentially 
impacting upon the ecosystems of a watercourse to take all appropriate measures to protect 
and preserve these ecosystems.  The standards to be expected of states will be informed by 
‘any standards and practices applicable in the region, among the States in question, or among 
                                                 
76 Agenda 21, Chapter 18, para. 18,2, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), p. 167. 
77 Para. 18.8, p. 168 (emphasis added). 
States of a comparable level of development’ (McCaffrey, 2001: 395).  Indeed, such standards 
of state behaviour may, in the light of the continuing evolution of the precautionary principle, 
be interpreted to require ‘the establishment of holistic programmes of watercourse protection, 
which should be proactive and anticipatory rather than reactive and remedial in nature’.  The 
precautionary nature of the obligation may impose a rigorous, proactive duty on states.  It is 
significant that the 1990 statement of the Chairman of the ILC Drafting Committee 
emphasized that the earlier reference in draft Article 20 to the duty of states ‘to take all 
reasonable measures’ was deleted in order to strengthen the obligation of protection (ILC 
Yearbook, 1990: 281).  Also, though it is not made explicit under Article 20 that the 
obligation to protect watercourse ecosystems would be subject to equitable balancing in the 
same way as other environmental obligations relating to watercourse use, it is bound to be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the general principles of the Convention.  The ILC has 
expressly linked the obligation contained in Article 20 to the predominant principle of 
equitable utilization as set out under Article 5 of the Convention by stating that it is ‘a specific 
application of the requirement contained in Article 5 that watercourse States are to use and 
develop an international watercourse in a manner that is consistent with adequate protection 
thereof’ (ILC Report, 1994: 282).   
Furthermore, the ecosystem approach has been closely linked to the concept of 
sustainable development, which is central to the notion of equitable utilization.  Leading 
commentators have noted in relation to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization – 
the primary substantive principle of international water law as set out under Articles 5 and 6 
of the 1997 Convention – that ‘[T]he principle provides, indeed requires, that states take into 
consideration the factors tied to sustainable development of the resource, thus providing the 
legal framework for operationalising this concept’ (Wouters and Rieu-Clarke, 2001: 283).  
Another points out that the concept of sustainable development and the principle of equitable 
utilization resemble each other insofar as both revolve around a balancing of interests and 
involve an amalgamation of method and aim (Kroes, 1997: 83).  In the context of the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the present author has suggested that ‘[I]n seeking to reconcile 
these two principles, it might be wiser to think of equitable utilization as a formulation of 
sustainable development applicable to international water resources’ (McIntyre, 1998: 88).  
Clearly, ecosystem protection would be subject to equitable balancing under the principle of 
equitable utilization.  However, it is likely to enjoy a certain significance, especially as several 
of the factors expressly enumerated for consideration under Article 6 of the UN Convention, 
including ecological factors,78 economy of use79 and potential uses of the watercourse,80 could 
only emphasize the related objectives of sustainable development and ecosystem protection.  
The ILC has noted that ‘protection and preservation of aquatic ecosystems help to ensure their 
continued viability as life supporting systems, thus providing an essential basis for sustainable 
development’ (ILC Report, 1994: 281-282).  Indeed, several commentators have concluded 
that ‘under the Convention, ecosystem protection is conceived as inherent in the idea of 
equitable use’ (Brunnée and Toope, 1995: 65; Tanzi and Arcari, 2001: 245).  McCaffrey 
(2001: 20; Hey, 1995: 141-143; Nollkaemper, 1996: 67-69) refers to the requirement that 
‘equitable utilization must be re-oriented’ for the purpose of effective ecosystem protection.   
Involving immensely complex scientific determinations about the likelihood and 
seriousness of possible ecological impacts, the ecosystems approach, as elaborated under 
international law, necessarily makes the standards of due diligence expected of states more 
complex.  This is especially true of the expectation that states will protect the watercourse 
ecosystem while equitably balancing ecosystems protection objectives against other relevant 
factors.  In light of this, it is evident that the emergence of the ecosystems approach can only 
                                                 
78 Article 6(a). 
79 Article 6(f). 
80 Article 6(e). 
emphasize the benefits offered by permanent joint technical commissions, without which it 
seems unlikely that such a sophisticated approach could ever be effectively implemented.  
 
Transboundary environmental impact assessment 
 
 In practical terms, the customary obligation to prevent transboundary pollution, one of 
the fundamental rules of international environmental law, requires that states consider the 
likely impacts of present and anticipated activities on the environment of other states, and that 
this has inspired the introduction of legal procedures generally referred to as ‘environmental 
impact assessment’ (Dupuy, 1991: 66-68).  Leading commentators link the introduction of 
transboundary environmental impact assessment procedures with implementation of the 
general obligation to prevent harm and, more particularly, with the duty to cooperate, 
concluding that ‘[W]ithout the benefit of an EIA the duty to notify and consult other states in 
cases of transboundary risk will in many cases be meaningless’ (Birnie and Boyle, 2002: 108, 
113 and 131).  Another commentator writes that ‘Principle 21 [of the Stockholm Declaration] 
does seem logically to require … transboundary environmental impact assessment.  
Otherwise, the substantive prohibition on transboundary harm would be largely meaningless 
…’ (Knox, 2002: 295-296).  The EIA technique is now widely supported and utilized in 
international law.  Several international organizations concerned with protection of the 
environment have adopted recommendations and declarations which endorse EIA, including 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),81 the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO),82 and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP).83  Significantly, Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration states that 
                                                 
81 OECD Council Recommendation C(74)216, Analysis of the Environmental Consequences of Significant 
Public and Private Projects (14 November 1974); OECD Council Recommendation C(79)116, Assessment of 
Projects with Significant Impact on the Environment (8 May 1979); OECD Council Recommendation C(85)104, 
Environmental Assessment of Development Assistance Projects and Programmes (20 June 1985). 
82 FAO Comparative Legal Strategy on Environmental Impact Assessment and Agricultural Development 
(1982). 
83 UNEP, Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment (UNEP/GC/DEC/14/25, 1987).    
Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for 
proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the 
environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.    
 
Similarly, among many references to EIA, Agenda 21 calls on states to ensure that 
‘relevant decisions are preceded by environmental impact assessments and also take into 
account the costs of any ecological consequences’.84   
In addition, numerous binding international treaties include provisions requiring the 
performance of an EIA in specific circumstances. More prominent examples include the 1974 
Nordic Environmental Protection Convention,85 the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea,86 the UNEP Regional Seas Conventions,87 the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,88 the 1986 Convention for the Protection 
of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region,89 the 1989 Basle 
Convention on Transboundary Movements of Waste,90 the 1991 Antarctic Protocol,91 the 
1992 Climate Change Convention,92 and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.93 In 1991, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) adopted a specific and 
comprehensive Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, which had 42 state parties by December 2007.94  The International Law 
Commission’s Draft Convention on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm, itself a long-term 
and influential exercise in the codification of customary and general international law, 
                                                 
84 Para. 8.4.  See also, inter alia, paras. 7.41(b), 8.5(b), 10.8(b). 
85 (1974) 13 ILM 511, Article 6. 
86 (1982) 21 ILM 1261, Article 206. 
87 1976 Barcelona Dumping Protocol, Annex III; 1978 Kuwait Convention, Article XI; 1981 Abidjan 
Convention, Article 13; 1981 Lima Convention, Article 8; 1982 Jeddah Convention, Article XI; 1983 Cartagena 
Convention, Article 12; 1985 Nairobi Convention, Article 13; 1986 Noumea Convention, Article 16. 
88 (1985) 15 Environmental Policy and Law, p. 64., Article 14(1). 
89 (1987) 26 ILM 38. 
90 28 ILM (1989) 657, Article 4(2)(f) and Annex V(A). 
91 30 ILM (1991) 1461, Article 8 and Annex I. 
92 31 ILM (1992) 851, Article 4(1)(f). 
93 31 ILM (1992) 818, Article Articles 7(c) and 14(1)(a).  
94 30 ILM (1991), 802 (Espoo, 25 February 1991).  In force 27 June 1997.  
includes an article on transboundary EIA, which requires an evaluation of the possible 
impacts of projects or activities on persons, property, and the environment of other states.95 
For planned projects or activities potentially affecting shared international freshwater 
resources, some form of transboundary EIA is now usually required in bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, and common in state practice (Teclaff, 1985: 240; Cooper, 1986: 303; 
Nollkaemper, 1993: 180).  The 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes expressly requires that  
The Parties shall develop, adopt, implement and, as far as possible, render compatible 
relevant legal, administrative, economic, financial and technical measures, in order to 
ensure … that … [E]nvironmental impact assessment and other forms of assessment 
are applied.96 
 
The 1992 Convention further provides for ongoing assessment, Article 11(3) requiring that 
The Riparian Parties shall, at regular intervals, carry out joint or coordinated 
assessments of the conditions of transboundary waters and the effectiveness of 
measures taken for the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary impact.  
The results of these assessments shall be made available to the public in accordance 
with the provisions set out in article 16 of this Convention.  
 
Though the 1997 UN Convention does not expressly require the conduct of an EIA before the 
implementation of planned projects or activities which may have a significant effect, Okowa 
(1996: 279) suggests generally that  
[I]t is nevertheless arguable that even in those instances where no specific provision is 
made, environmental impact assessment may be taken to be implicit in other 
procedural duties, in particular the duty to notify other States of proposed activities 
that may entail transboundary harm.  
 
Indeed, it is under Article 12 of the UN Convention, relating to the duty of 
watercourse states to notify other watercourse states of planned measures with possible 
adverse effects, that the EIA process receives its only explicit mention under the Convention.  
Article 12 provides: 
                                                 
95 Report of the International Law Commission (2001), GAOR A/56/10, Article 7. 
96 Article 3(1)(h). 
Before a watercourse State permits the implementation of planned measures which 
may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States, it shall provide 
those States with timely notification thereof.  Such notification shall be accompanied 
by available technical data and information, including the results of any environmental 
impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the possible 
effects of the planned measures. 
 
Therefore, the utility of the EIA process for the purpose of discharging the obligation to notify 
is expressly acknowledged.  An identical reference to EIA, made in connection with the 
obligation to notify, is contained in the 2000 SADC Revised Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses.97         
Also, since 1989, when the World Bank’s Environmental Assessment Directive was 
first issued,98 development projects funded by the Bank have been required to undergo an EIA 
procedure in order to assess their potential domestic, transboundary and global environmental 
effects, and such procedures are now the norm for all major development agencies.99  This is 
of particular significance for international watercourses where planned measures to utilize or 
develop water resources usually involve massive infrastructural investment and where most of 
the underdeveloped watercourses are situated in developing countries.  Indeed, several 
commentators have noted that ‘[I]n practice, many least-developed countries conduct EIA for 
projects only when it is required as a condition of international aid’ (Knox, 2002: 297).    
States have relied on the existence of a general requirement to carry out an EIA in 
several international disputes.  This argument has been used by both New Zealand and 
Hungary before the International Court of Justice.  In its request to the Court concerning 
French underground nuclear tests, New Zealand contended 
 … that France’s conduct is illegal in that it causes, or is likely to cause, the 
introduction into the maritime environment of radioactive material, France being 
                                                 
97 Article 4(1)(b). 
98 Summarized in (1990) 1? Yearbook of International Environmental Law, p. 333.  For the current rules, see 
Operational Manual OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment (1999).   
99 For the rules on EIA required for development projects funded by the Asian Development Bank, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, see (1993) 4? Yearbook of International Environmental Law, pp. 528-549.   
under an obligation, before carrying out its new underground nuclear tests, to provide 
evidence that they will not result in the introduction of such material to that 
environment, in accordance with the ‘precautionary principle’ very widely accepted in 
contemporary international law.100 
 
In its original application to the ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case, 101 Hungary also relied 
on the precautionary principle, which it perceived as a link between the obligation to cooperate 
and the duty to prevent transboundary environmental damage.  Hungary argued that the 
precautionary principle was supported by, inter alia, Article 3 of the 1991 ECE Convention on 
Transboundary EIA, which it argued represented general international law in relation to dams. 
The Convention also required states proposing measures which may have an appreciable adverse 
transboundary effect to notify other potentially affected states, to share available technical data 
and information, and to consult and negotiate with them in good faith.  Hungary contended that 
this obligation required that an adequate EIA be carried out and, though the Court did not address 
the need for prior EIA, it did stress that new environmental norms and standards have to be taken 
into account ‘not only when States contemplate new activities, but also when continuing 
activities begun in the past’.102 
It would appear, therefore, that states, international organizations and codification bodies 
regard environmental impact assessment procedures as essential to the effective discharge of 
the duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm and the related obligation to cooperate.  
In addition, it is seen as one means to effectively apply the precautionary principle, 
particularly in situations involving large-scale developments or projects or ultra-hazardous 
activities (McIntyre and Mosedale, 1997: 238-239).  At any rate, the requirement of prior 
transboundary EIA is very widely accepted.  By 1986, the Experts Group on Environmental 
                                                 
100 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests [New Zealand v. France] Case Order 22IX 95, I.C.J. Rep. [1995] 288, p. 
290 (emphasis added).  See also, Paras. 34 and 35.  (Craven, 1996: 725-734).  
101 Application of the Republic of Hungary v. The Czech and Slovak Republic on the Diversion of the Danube 
River. (Sands, Tarasofsky and Weiss, 1994: 693-698).  
102 At para. 140. 
Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development had identified 
environmental impact assessment as an ‘emerging principle of international law’, suggesting 
that, under customary international law, states planning to carry out or permit activities which 
might significantly affect the environment should make or require an assessment of their 
effects before carrying out or permitting the planned activities (Munro and Lammers, 1987: 
58-62). 
Though EIAs are context-dependent in terms of their content and adequacy, Okowa (1996: 
282-285) identifies certain minimum core components of a good assessment, largely on the basis 
of the 1991 ECE Convention and the 1987 UNEP Guidelines.  These include that the assessment 
must be carried out when the proposed project or activity is still at the planning stage so that the 
results may be properly taken into consideration and, pending full consultations with those states 
likely to be affected, that the state proposing the activity entailing transboundary harm should be 
debarred from proceeding with it.  Also, the nature of the proposed activity and its likely 
environmental consequences, as identified by the EIA, must be clearly articulated and 
communicated to those likely to be affected.  In addition, the requirements of good faith should 
apply to any notification and ensuing consultations. Moreover, the practice of assessment 
evolves through, inter alia, the collection and study of environmental impact statements in 
central repositories, the adoption of a general convention on transboundary EIA, which is 
widely taken to set universal minimum standards for transboundary EIA procedures, and the 
elaboration of sector-specific guidelines by multilateral development banks103 or non-
governmental organizations.104 Therefore, an increasingly sophisticated means of identifying, 
                                                 
103 For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has adopted an 
Environmental Policy which seeks to ensure, through a detailed environmental appraisal process, that the 
projects it finances are designed to operate in compliance with applicable environmental requirements.  To this 
end, the EBRD has prepared detailed Environmental Procedures which provide guidance as to how the 
environmental appraisal should be conducted with over 80 sets of Sub-Sectoral Environmental Guidelines 
covering, for example, fish processing, logging, stone, sand and gravel extraction, pulp and paper, hazardous 
waste management, potable water supplies, etc. 
104 See, for example, the guidelines published by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) in relation to the 
construction and operation of large dams, at http://www.panda.org/dams 
understanding and communicating environmental concerns is developing which ensures that 
such concerns can readily be taken into account by decision makers and policy makers.  
Numerous international expert groups, such as the World Water Council (WWC)105 and the 
Global Water Partnership (GWP),106 have contributed to the formulation of guidelines, codes 
of conduct, or practice standards for the exploitation of shared water resources, all advocating 
the use of EIA procedures.  The World Commission on Dams (WCD), a forum which brought 
together representatives of all stakeholders with an interest in dam-building, including 
environmental NGOs, reported its conclusions in 2000 and proposed 26 guidelines for the 
building of dams, including guidelines for the protection of the environment that advocate the 
use of EIA procedures.107  In view of the increasing legal significance and sophistication of 
the transboundary EIA process, the role for permanent technical joint commissions is obvious.     
  
Conclusion 
 
Although states cannot be bound to adopt a community of interests approach to inter-state 
cooperation on the management of international freshwater resources, or to join or participate 
in related institutional machinery of common management, such as permanent technical river 
basin commissions, governments increasingly volunteer to do so. Such agreement assists them 
in establishing compliance with their legal obligation to cooperate in the management of the 
shared waters.  Though institutional arrangements have much to commend them, it seems that 
one of their most significant contributions is to the effective environmental protection of 
international watercourses.  Though these bodies can vary greatly in terms of their functions, 
powers and organizational structure, most enjoy an express mandate to pursue environmental 
protection under their founding instruments, as well as a technically competent and relatively 
                                                 
105 See www.worldwatercouncil.org for the WWC’s World Water Actions Inventory which lists 840 actions, 
campaigns, legal proceeding, policy initiatives, etc. where the issue of EIA of freshwater projects is central.  
106 See www.gwpforum.org, which lists numerous technical papers and reports prepared or commissioned by the 
Global Water Partnership.  
107 World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making (The Report 
of the World Commission on Dams) (Earthscan, 2000).  
well resourced permanent staff.  Furthermore, the mandate and ability of such bodies to 
participate in, undertake, or oversee the conduct of transboundary environmental impact 
assessment procedures provides them with a central role in the key process under international 
law for ensuring that considerations of environmental protection are adequately taken into 
account in the determination of an equitable and reasonable regime for the utilization of an 
international watercourse. The emergence of the so-called ‘ecosystems approach’ to the 
environmental protection of international watercourses broadens the range of issues that come 
within the ambit of environmental protection, and greatly complicates the tasks of 
anticipating, preventing and mitigating environmental harm.  This lies at the heart of the EIA 
process, thus increasing reliance on joint commissions with trusted technical expertise and 
established procedures and methodologies.  One can only conclude that where there is a 
genuine will among states to cooperate to achieve optimal utilization of a shared freshwater 
resource, joint institutional machinery will quickly follow which will have environmental 
protection as one of its key tasks.  Indeed, it has long been understood among international 
environmental lawyers that such institutional arrangements are essential for effective 
environmental protection.  As one commentator notes 
States party to modern international environmental agreements confirm through their 
practice that ‘sustainable development’ has an institutional as well as substantive side 
[and, further, that] states have a clear preference for institutionalised treaties as the 
basis for administration of natural resources (Röben, 2000: 442).  
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